I. Introduction
In the development of a theory of money and financial institutions, there are three kinds of questions which should be clearly differentiated: (1)
Why does money come into use, and how? (2) What keeps it in use? (3) What strategic limitations does its use impose on trade, what additional possibilities does it open up, and what are the institutional implications?
The first would involve both historical research and a study of transactions costs and markets. It would be interesting to explore such questions Our exposition is based on a multicommodity model of trade as a game in strategic form, to which the noncooperative solution concept of Nash (1951) may be applied. The model is strategically closed, in that, unlike the classical equilibrium models, prices are determined by the actions of the traders, and the system as a whole responds meaningfully to the traders' decisions, even away from equilibrium.' The mathematical proof of the existence of a Nash equilibrium and its relationship to the competitive equilibrium of Walras will be presented elsewhere; here we concentrate on an elementary but, we hope, informative exposition, making much use of "Edgeworth" box diagrams. These will enable us to visualize the qualitative effects of monetized trade on such things as price formation, feasibility, Pareto optimality, and equilibrium.
It is worth emphasizing that we are presenting here not a single model with a fixed viewpoint on the nature of money but, rather, a general modeling approach, or framework, within which many different properties and users of money and financial institutions can be analyzed and compared. Our "money" can be a valuable, consumable commodity, or it can be merely paper, of no intrinsic worth. Even in a one-period model, various forms of credit can be introduced, and the trade-inhibiting effects of a limited money supply can be represented. In multiperiod models (not treated here, but see Sec. VIA below), one can go further and introduce lending institutions and derive interest rates. While we make no pretense that we are able to capture all of the complex factors associated with the use of money and financial institutions, it seems reasonable to hope that our approach, extended or elaborated in one direction or another, will prove useful as a basis for more extensive investigations of many facets of this subject.
II. Some Preliminaries on Economics and Modeling
Before proceeding to the description of a specific trading game, it may be useful to discuss some of the highlights of our approach in general terms. In particular, we would like to comment on (a) the differences between commodities, commodity money, and fiat money; (b) the institutional implications of cash and credit; and (c) the distinction between the (legal) rules of the game and the (behavioral) rules of play and the 1 In his important early paper, Debreu (1952) represents the Walras exchange model as a game in strategic form for the technical purpose of applying a general existence theorem. But as a descriptive model his game shares the defect of the Walrasian model of being ill defined, or unrealistically defined, away from equilibrium. Indeed, if only one agent departs from equilibrium, he is presumed to be able to buy and sell at the stated prices, announced by an added fictive player whose objective is to minimize excess demand. But there is no explanation of how the excess demand thereby created is to be satisfied-unless it is out of the bottomless warehouses of the fictive player. See also Arrow and Debreu (1954) and Arrow and Hahn (1971, chap. 5) . reasons for our selection of the Nash noncooperative equilibrium for the analysis of the latter. In Section VI some other general points will be touched upon, in connection with possible variations and extensions of our model.
A. Money and Commodities
In this paper we are frankly concentrating on the "means of payment" role of money. We cannot contend that this is money's only or even its most important reason for being. But we do argue that this is its most conspicuous function in everyday economic life and that the payment process has hardly received a fair share of attention in modern mathematical economics. We shall therefore treat money as an element of strategy (in the game-theory sense) and not merely regard it as either an insubstantial price-reporting or book-balancing abstraction, on the one hand, or just another commodity to be traded and consumed, on the other.
Several authors, in the study of cooperative-game solutions to economic models, have had recourse to utility functions of the following special form:
U1(x) = u'(X' * X) + A X+1
where the (m + 1) th commodity may be regarded as a kind of transferable utility, or "u-money" (see, e.g., Shapley and Shubik 1966, pp. 807-8; 1969a , 1976 Telser 1972 , pp. 4-11; and Aumann and Shapley 1974, p. 180). Although the vague phrase "market game with money" would seem to cover both this approach and our present noncooperative model, the connection is only superficial. In cooperative solutions such as the core and the value, the underlying strategic form of the game is irrelevant, and all attention is directed to the actions and potential actions of coalitions. The "u-money," if available, serves only as a vehicle for side payments that adjust the final distribution of utility among traders in coalition. There has been little interest in formulating cooperative trading games in which money plays a distinguished role in the trading technology; in fact, core theory (with good reason) has traditionally stood aloof from the processes of trade and price formation. 2 In our present work, we do not assume that the utility of the payment commodity is additively separable, as above. But it is possible that such an assumption might simplify some of our results or proofs or ensure uniqueness or other good behavior on the part of the noncooperative equilibria, just as it does for the classical competitive equilibria.3 At least the question merits further study.
Viewed as a commodity, real or fictitious, money is distinguished in practice by its near-universal acceptability in exchange for other commodities.4 The reasons for its acceptance lie as much in the realms of the laws and customs of society as in pure individualistic economic reasoning. In an economic model that is not intended to encompass social and legal developments, it may be taken as axiomatic that the monetary good will be accepted at face value according to the existing conventions of the marketplace, regardless of its intrinsic worth or lack of worth. In our present model, we shall require that all exchanges be for money. An interesting consequence of this rule is that the set of attainable redistributions of goods will fail to include many redistributions that would be possible if arbitrary, transaction-cost-free barter were allowed. ' It should be noted that this curtailment also occurs under the classical rules of Walrasian exchange at stated prices. This is not necessarily unrealistic. A similar curtailment of the feasible set occurs in practice, we believe, in most societies that rely on organized markets and relatively stable price systems for the redistribution of goods.
Because of its general acceptability a means of payment has obvious value to its holder, but this value need not show itself in his utility function.6 Indeed a fiat money would enter the utility function only through the effect of truncation: unspent money at the game's end may be presumed to have buying power in the world to come. (You can take it with you!) A commodity money, on the other hand, like gold or silver, has utility in its own right, to which we may add any extra buying power it may be considered to possess an alternative or incremental value conferred by society's acceptance of its special monetary role.7
It is obvious that an adequate investigation of the utility of money demands a dynamic treatment in a multiperiod model, with the possibility of durable as well as perishable goods. We forgo any such in-3 With an additively separable "u-money" in sufficient supply, the competitive allocations of the other goods are just those that maximize the sum E u (x)I/i; thus a "fixed-point" situation reduces to a simpler maximization problem. 7 Such an adjustment for buying power may be called for even in the case of pure barter. A person's utility for a large quantity of wheat, for example, evaluated at a particular point in time, may depend in part on his expectation of being able to trade it later for something more directly useful to him. It is difficult to treat this subject with any precision in a static, one-period model. vestigation in this paper, adopting, instead, the expedient of reserving a place in the utility functions for the "means of payment" without insisting that it actually be consumable or have utility. Within this framework we can encompass the range between a commodity money of great intrinsic worth, at one extreme, and a perishable fiat money, at the other.
B. Cash and Credit
Our point of departure will be a basic model where "cash" payments are required in advance on all purchases. We then explore some ways of relaxing this condition, via a sort of shopkeepers' credit in the form of deferred payments secured by expected receipts. Since only a one-period model is considered, interest rates and the money market cannot be fairly represented. Nevertheless, some institution-modeling problems do appear, since beyond a narrow zone of "conservative" credit (see Sec. IVB below) the possibility of insolvency and default exists and must be faced if the game is to be well defined. It may seem overelaborate to burden the abstract model with the details of a bankruptcy proceeding in which the assets of the trader who cannot pay his bills are liquidated to satisfy the creditors. Yet important properties of the game and its equilibria may well depend on just how such details are handled, once we relax the "cash on the barrelhead" rule.8 One simple expedient is to allow negative holdings of "cash" at the game's end while postulating a disutility (suitably concave and continuous) for being "in the red." Implicitly there are loan sharks, swimming outside the model, who pay off the creditors while making life uncomfortable for the debtors, but the burden of providing detailed rules for insolvency is avoided.
Even without default there are institutional overtones in the granting of credit. Suppose a trader pays for some goods with promissory notes rather than cash, expecting to redeem them with cash received from the sale of his own goods. What if some of his customers also use promissory notes? When and how does the redistribution of the actual "means of payment" commodity take place? It appears that a central clearinghouse must be created. This would represent a major change in the nature of the model, which-as will be seen is otherwise quite clearly decentralized, with respect to both traders and commodities.
While we cannot enter into a detailed discussion here, it is important to note also that credit generally involves a contract between two parties, whereas cash generally does not (except perhaps in the weak sense that an individual holder of a dollar bill may regard himself as a creditor of the government). We may for convenience describe a person's indebtedness as "negative cash," but it is basically a different instrument. In a society where all pay cash, default and the laws and procedures for dealing with it need not be considered. A society with even the simplest forms of credit is fundamentally more complex than one without credit, and it can adequately be represented only by a fundamentally more complex model.
C. Rules and Solutions
The game theorist is usually at great pains to assure himself that the rules of the game are completely defined before he turns to the problem of solving it. The reason for this caution stems from the fact that, while the descriptive theory covering the moves and strategies and information and payoffs, etc. can be "hard" and mathematically precise, the solution theory is often "soft" and indeterminate, since it expresses the actions of sophisticated, free-willed decision makers. In the multiperson non-zerosum games common in economics, this indeterminacy shows itself both in the multitude of different solution concepts that game theory offers for consideration-like core, value, bargaining set, noncooperative equilibrium, etc.-and in the nonuniqueness of outcome that is so often exhibited by the actual solutions, under any one of these concepts.
We would like to stress, therefore, that we are presenting a welldefined game in the descriptive sense, formulated independently of any assumptions of equilibrium or of what might or might not be "rational" behavior. When the players have made their individual decisions, the market prices and the transfers of goods are completely determined. To this game a variety of solution concepts might be applied, but the rules of the game and its solution are two different things.
Having said this, we must admit that we have built our model in a particular way (in a "strategic" form, as opposed, say, to a "coalitional" form) in anticipation of applying a particular solution concept-the "Nash" noncooperative equilibrium. In much of our previous work in this general area we have, instead, used the coalitional form and (with many others) have considered static, essentially noninstitutional games of exchange and/or production, establishing some interesting links between the competitive equilibrium and the core or other cooperative game concepts.9 However, this kind of coalitional approach fails to capture the dynamics of price formation and the essentially individualistic nature of much economic decision making, and so further investigations using noncooperative game concepts now seem to be in order.
The classical model is content to take prices as though given by an "invisible hand," insensitive to the actions of the traders at least in the short run. There is an implicit understanding, not reflected in any mathematical assumption of the classical model, that the traders are so numerous and their individual resources so small that this insensitivity is a good approximation to reality. Our model, on the other hand, has prices that depend in a reasonable way on the individual trading decisions. They are driven upward by increased buying and downward by increased selling. This puts us into a position to examine the validity of the classical assumption of unyielding prices when the traders are not individually insignificant and, indeed, to explore the transition zone between perfect competition 'a la Walras and oligopolistic competition a la Cournot. But to carry out this program, our game-theoretic solution concept must be strategy oriented and collusion free, and the Nash noncooperative equilibrium is ideally suited to this purpose.
It may be of interest to point out in conclusion that if we were to reduce our present model to its characteristic function,10 we would get a different cooperative game from the unrestricted-barter or "Edgeworth" game that is usually considered in connection with the core. The reason is that our rules cause all trade to use a single set of prices. If goods, or goods and money, pass between Traders 1 and 2 in a certain ratio, then they cannot pass between 1 and 3 in a different ratio. From the coalitional standpoint, this restriction on trade can lead to a paradoxical result-a failure of superadditivity. In fact, if we make the natural assumption that subeconomies can form and establish their own price systems, then an economy that is fractured into opposing coalitions may be able to reach allocations on the Pareto surface that cannot be achieved by the same economy united."1
III. The Basic Model
In order to describe a well-defined game of exchange in which a specific commodity is used as a means of payment, we must spell out how the prices are formed. The classic general equilibrium model is content to establish the existence of prices (often not unique) at equilibrium. For a proper game model, however, we need rules that determine the prices for positions of disequilibrium as well. With every player free to make an independent decision, the model must yield a well-defined output for every set of inputs.
Several types of price-forming mechanisms might be considered, each placing different restrictions on the strategic possibilities. In particular the traders might control only the quantities offered or demanded, or they might name reservation prices or price ranges or even complete demand curves for their individual transactions. Multistage bargaining might be introduced, or a centralized procedure that converts a set of unilateral price declarations into a unique, market-wide price for each good.'2 Here, as we are interested in general, anonymous exchange, with marketwide prices but with a minimum of ad hoc institutional detail, we adopt what is essentially a generalization of Cournot's original approach. The strategic variables will be quantities, not prices, but they will include quantities of the special good that serves as "cash" or "trading money." Indeed, in our simplest version, only that good will be subject to strategic choice.
Formally, in our prototype model we shall assume that there are n traders trading in m + 1 goods, where the (m + 1) th good has a special operational role in addition to its possible utility in consumption. We attribute to each trader an initial bundle of goods,1 3 ai = (ail,..., am, am+?), and a concave utility function,
We emphasize that ui need not actually depend on xl I; the possibility of a fiat money is not excluded. The general procedure will be for the traders to put up quantities of the first m goods to be sold and simultaneously to put up quantities of the (m + 1) th good to buy them, all at prices determined by the market-wide supply and demand for each good. For expository purposes, our prototype model will require the traders to offer for sale all of their holdings of the first m goods, though they need not spend all of their (m + 1) th good. A trader may well buy some of his original goods back, but they must go through the market. In other words, in this version of the model the trader does not own his initial bundle outright; he merely owns a claim on the proceeds when the bundle is sold.'4 12 Levitan and Shubik (1971, 1972) have given examples of different strategy spaces and Pareto surfaces that are possible in oligopolistic models.
13 Superscripts will be used consistently to denote traders. Summation over traders will be denoted by a horizontal bar; thus dj means n E aj.
14 This simplifying condition is not as unreasonable as it might appear at first glance. In a multiperiod context, it would amount to requiring that all "paper" profits or losses be realized every trading period. Some other modeling possibilities will be discussed in Sec. VI below. Note that there is no assumption that good m + 1 has intrinsic value to anyone. It must merely be available to enough people so that nontrivial markets for the other goods can be formed.
Our reasons for concentrating on the noncooperative equilibrium rather than on one of the cooperative solutions of game theory have already been discussed in Section IIC. We would like merely to reiterate here that at least one purpose of our work is to formulate and study the descriptive game model, without reference to any particular solution concept. Indeed much of the discussion that follows concerns what are sometimes called "presolution" concepts like feasibility, Pareto optimality, or individual rationality, which do not depend on equilibrium notions at all.
IV. The Edgeworth Box
The case m = 1, n = 2 lends itself to simple two-dimensional descriptive analysis based on the familiar Edgeworth box. To avoid the confusion of too many lines and curves in one place, we shall make a sequence of diagrams, using the same labels as far as possible. As we shall see, much of this geometry will apply also to the general case, with many goods and traders, because of the way in which the operation of the system "decouples" both the traders and the trading posts.
In figure 2 illustrates a noncooperative or "Nash" equilibrium (NE) for the market. Neither trader, knowing the strategy of the other, would wish to change. A striking feature of this kind of equilibrium is its nonoptimality. Since curves AWB' and A2B2 are not generally tangent to each other, the point F cannot be expected to be Pareto optimal or "efficient."'9 In effect, the traders are working with unequal marginal prices, represented by the unequal slopes of AWB' and A2B2 at F. Any outcome in the shaded region would be preferred by both traders to the NE allocation at F. In particular, they would both profit from increased trade at the average price p , represented by the slope of RF.
The reader familiar with the Edgeworth diagram will recognize the 19 Indeed Pareto optimality in a NE can only occur at corners of the indifference curves or in special cases like F = R or F = B2. contract curve C1EP 2C2 in figure 4, which is a subset of the more extensive Pareto set 01P 'CEP2C2Q2.
The competitive equilibrium (CE) is represented by the competitive price ray RE, which is tangent to both indifference curves at the competitive allocation E. The situation illustrated seems to be typical: there is less volume of trade at the NE than at the CE. But the reverse is also possible. In fact, by a somewhat contorted but perfectly legitimate arrangement of the indifference contours, we could make any given point outside the dotted lines in figure 4 the location of a unique CE, while keeping a unique NE at F.
Although we have not illustrated it, it is also not difficult to construct utility functions for which several distinct strategy pairs (Si, S2) are in noncooperative equilibrium. This may or may not be accompanied by a corresponding multiplicity of CE; the two kinds of solution are not directly interlinked. But their general mathematical properties are quite similar. For example, we would expect that even for general m and n, if the utility functions are smooth and the initial allocation is chosen according to a nonatomic probability distribution, then with probability 1 there will be a finite, odd number of NE (cf. Debreu 1970).
B. The Feasible Set and Credit
The set of feasible outcomes can be determined by holding one trader's bid at its upper extreme 0 or lower extreme M' and sweeping through the strategies of the other trader. The feasible set is shown in figure 5 (solid shading); for example, outcome L results if both traders bid their upper limit.20 This feasible set has nothing to do with rationality or motivation; it merely describes those outcomes that the mechanism can be made to produce. It necessarily contains all NE allocations, but, as for the CE allocations, we know a priori only that they lie in the quadrants of the Edgeworth box "northwest" or "southeast" of the point R. It may well be that some or all of the CE allocations fall outside of the feasible set, under our present trading rules.
By introducing credit we can enlarge the feasible set, permitting the traders to bid more of the "means of payment" commodity than they actually possess as cash on hand. In diagrammatic terms, the first trader, say, could be allowed the segment COM' instead of W'M' (fig. 5) . The 20 Most boundary points are attainable, but those on the line M1M2 are not, except for R itself. There is, however, an exceptional "null" outcome, not in the Edgeworth box, in which Trader 1 bids and gets MI and Trader 2 bids and gets M2. Our rule is that if a trader bids nothing he gets nothing, even if the price is zero. So if both traders bid nothing, the entire stock of good 1 is lost. (We may imagine that it goes to an otherwise unnoticed "scavenger," who sends infinitesimal bids to each trading post in the hope of making a killing.) This exceptional outcome is manifestly undesirable and unstable, and it has no real effect on the solutions of the game, though it causes technical difficulties in the existence proof. If we alter the rules of the game to enable both traders to use this conservative banking credit, the feasible set is extended as indicated by the stripes in figure 5. For example, outcome L' results if both traders bid up to their new limits. The new feasible set still does not fill up the two basic quadrants, however, and so we still cannot be sure that any competitive outcomes will be attainable.
With more liberal credit, the feasible set would cover a larger part of the two basic rectangles and eventually all of them, but it would also include areas above and below the Edgeworth box, representing situations in which one or the other trader is "caught short." If we regard credit as the issue of a financial instrument, the interpretation of a point outside the box is simple and familiar-it amounts to stating that after trade an individual ends up with none of the monetary commodity in hand and with outstanding claims that he cannot meet. In order to complete the model we must either describe the utility to any player at such an outcome or add further moves to the game, corresponding to bankruptcy proceedings (see Sec. IIB).
C. Individual Rationality
In the present version of our model we are requiring that all of the initial endowments, except for the "payment" commodity, be put up for sale.22 Consequently the concept of ownership is somewhat different from that usually assumed in microeconomics and is closer to that in law. All goods are monetized, and trade is virtually anonymous. The economy is an accountant's dream, but by forcing goods to pass through the market ownership rights are weakened. In particular, it may be impossible for a person to recover the bundle he originally started with or obtain an equivalent bundle. On the other hand, he may be able unilaterally to guarantee an outcome superior to his initial holding. (This contrasts with the classical Edgeworth and modern "core" models, where an individual trader can always defend his initial holdings if he so desires, but no more.)
The "defensive" possibilities are easily illustrated. In figure 6 the first trader is fortunate, since he has relatively little of good 1 that must go to market and relatively much of good 2 that he can use at his discretion. He cannot, of course, protect his exact initial holding, since this would mean being able to enforce outcome R regardless of the other's choice of S 2. But he can force the outcome to have as much utility for him as R. In fact, by playing S1 as shown, he restricts the possible outcomes to the set A2B2, a set which lies entirely on the "high" side of the indifference of a trader's own money that will surely come back to him from his own bids. In this respect our two-trader exposition may be misleading. We may also remark that "conservative" credit does not require the aid of a central clearinghouse (see Sec. IIB), as any promissory notes can be redeemed at each trading post independently.
22 But see Sec. VI, where this requirement is removed. The second trader, on the other hand, has a relatively poor defensive position. The highest u2 indifference curve that completely contains one of the A'B' sets is the curve u2= c2, which is distinctly inferior to R for him. There are two critical points: the endpoint A' and the tangency point near B'. As S2 moves, the A'B' curve rotates on R. Raising S2 would make A' worse, while lowering S2 would make the critical point near B' worse, so S2 is the "max-mmn" strategy.
The shaded area in figure 6 represents the so-called individually rational allocations, bounded by the curves al= cl and u2 = c2. The feasible individually rational allocations are just those that lie beneath the horizontal line RM 2, and it is a theorem that every NE solution will lie in that region. In contrast, the Walras-Edgeworth individually rational zone, which contains every CE solution, would be defined by the two indifference curves through R (not shown). It is easy to see that this region could be entirely disjoint from the other. This is not too surprising, as the two regions arise from games with the same economic data but different rules of trade.
D. Many Traders
The same diagrams can be used, one-sidedly, when there are more than two traders. This is because our model has the aggregation property, with both strategies and outcomes being additive over traders. Viewed by the other traders, a set or coalition of traders acting together is hardly distinguishable from a single, larger trader. In the diagrams, we may regard the point S2 not as a single bid but as the vector sum of bids by Traders 2, 3, . . ., n, using R as the "origin" from which the vectors are defined. The first trader may notice a quantitative but not a qualitative difference from the two-person case: since the other traders combined may have far more resources than he does alone, the distance of S2 from R and S' may make the slope of S'S2 (i.e., the price) almost insensitive to his own choice.
It might appear at first glance that the feasible set, when there are many traders, would continue to be a sizable fraction of the set of outcomes that are feasible under unrestricted, Edgeworthian barter. But this is not the case. Let us count dimensions. The unrestricted allocation space has dimension (m + l)(n -1).23 Even in the case m = 1, there are 2n -2 dimensions of possible outcomes if trade is not required to pass through the "trading post" mechanism. This compares with the n dimensions at most that can arise when n traders bid by each selecting a point on a line as his strategy. Thus, starting at m = 1, n = 3, the feasible set is only a lower-dimensional surface or manifold in the set of outcomes that would be possible under unrestricted trading.
E. Many Commodities
Since the trading posts operate essentially independently of each other, it is possible to continue to use these diagrams when there are more than two commodities (i.e., more than one trading post). But there are two ways in which the markets remain intercoupled: (1) through the spending limits, which apply to all bids combined, so that a trader's upper bound at each trading post will depend on what he spends at the others, and (2) through the utility functions, which in general reflect complementaries, Now suppose that Trader 1 changes his allocation of cash between goods 1 and 2, causing points S1 and S to move in opposite directions. The point F will then trace out a curve in space, which we have tried to suggest by the open dots perched above the curve's projection on the base. This projection on the base shows the tradeoff between goods 1 and 2 when a fixed amount of cash is bid by Trader 1; note that it is concave to his origin O0. If Trader 1 bids less than the maximum allowed (strict inequality above), a curved triangular surface is generated, extending out from F and the open dots toward the viewer and rising to an apex directly above O0. This locus (not shown) indicates ways in which Trader 1 can obtain more of good 3 at the expense of goods 1 and/or 2; it is concave to the origin 01, and its projection is the large, roughly triangular region in the base of the diagram. The first trader's best response to the other trader's given strategy (S2, S2) is determined by the relationship of this surface to the indifference surfaces of u', in the three-dimensional commodity space with origin at O0.
V. Replication
Inquiries into the behavior of economic models with large numbers of participants often make sweeping assumptions of symmetry, in the hope of keeping the models mathematically tractable and easy to visualize, while capturing at least some of the characteristic effects of large numbers. A favorite technique, involving a high but not total degree of symmetry, is called "replication." Imagine a basic economic system juxtaposed to a large number of identical replicas of itself; then take away all barriers, and form a "common market." Equivalently, assume that all traders in the full model are drawn from a small number of types, with an equal number of individuals of each type. Traders of the same type have identical endowments and identical tastes, but they are not constrained to act alike. That is, they are not programmed robots or members of a bloc or cartel but independent decision makers.25
The number of members of a type the "replication number"-provides the modeler with a simple size parameter that he can vary without calling for additional data. Of course we do not intend to treat replication as though it were some kind of actual economic event, like a homogeneous population increase or an accretion of similar countries to a common market. Replication should be considered only as a technical device of comparative statics. As such, however, it has repeatedly proved its worth in explorations of the size effect (see Edgeworth The expressions in curly brackets reveal the effect of oligopoly, but note that they lie between 1 and 1 -I/k. In the limit, therefore, these conditions for NE reduce to the conditions for CE, with the prices of the goods proportional to the marginal utilities of every trader. Thus we may state a convergence theorem, as follows:29 Theorem 2. Assume that for infinitely many values of k the market has a symmetric, interior NE, and let p(k) be the corresponding m-vector of prices. Let pi be any limit point of the Ap(k), 28 The conditions given in Theorem 1 in Sec. IIIB are sufficient to guarantee the existence of such a symmetric NE. It is quite possible also to have nonsymmetric NEs. 29 A somewhat more general form of this theorem will be found in Shapley (1976 
)
Pm Pm+ 1 will be competitive for the market (for any value of k); that is, an allocation x will exist for which x = a and, for each s and t, 'ts maximizes ut(xts) subject to x's > 0 and m+ 1 Z Aj(X7 -at7) = 0.
It should be noted that the NE approaches the CE "from below," that is, through outcomes that are not in general Pareto optimal. This contrasts with the convergence of cooperative solutions like the core and the value, which are by definition Pareto optimal all the way (see, e.g., Debreu and Scarf 1963; Shapley and Shubik 1969b; Debreu 1975; Owen 1975; and Shapley 1975) .
The type of convergence revealed in Theorem 2 depends crucially on having interior solutions, with no trader up against his spending limit. All must have enough cash (or credit, in an extended model), where the meaning of "enough" depends on the payment commodity's marginal utility relative to that of the other goods. Of course there can never be "enough" fiat money in this sense (in a one-period model), for the NE will always have everyone spending the limit and wishing he could spend more. If the CE is considered socially desirable (as one road to the Pareto optimum, if for no other reason), then a society whose trading system resembles our replicated model should make sure that the means of payment is something that is both widely available and generally desirable, either as a consumption item or as a means of payment in future periods.
VI. Variants and Extension
It is not difficult to modify the basic game so that the goods do not necessarily all pass through the market before consumption. A number of different considerations and problems arise, however, depending on just how this is done. We shall review some of them briefly here; for further details see Shapley (1976 The strategy domains at each trading post are now L-shaped, with a corner at the initial point R. Despite this corner, a trader in an active trading post should not experience any discontinuity in changing roles from buyer to seller, as his budget set is still the familiar, smooth hyperbola through R, as long as there are other traders on both sides of the market. The two-person case is rather trivial, however, there being no meaningful competition to motivate price formation. This modification does restore some semblance of uniqueness to the NE, but it has its own drawback: the game is not additive over players. A coalition has options not available to an individual. Thus, if a trader could split himself into two legal persons, he could buy and sell simultaneously at the same trading post (e.g., in an attempt to stabilize the price). This suggests that the restriction bJqJ = 0 might be unrealistic in some applications.
Any version of the rules that permits traders to stay out of a market has another peculiarity, namely, the possibility of trading posts that are 30 This multiplicity is not merely a matter of simultaneous buying and selling by the same trader that could simply be canceled out. Indeed, if at equilibrium Trader i is sending both goods and cash to the same trading post and if the price there is Pj, then he might consider decreasing both qf, and bM, in the ratio of 1 to pj. This would not change his final outcome (assuming that he does not spend the extra cash elsewhere) or the price pj, but it would change the marginal cost of good j to the other traders and so destroy the equilibrium. completely inactive. Such a situation is very stable, as no trader would want to enter a market where bj = qj = 0. He would either lose his goods or money or, at best, have them returned to him to no advantage. Thus the "null"strategy for all traders is always an equilibrium point, in both of the models above. Moreover, we can arbitrarily declare any subset of trading posts to be inactive and solve the remaining subeconomy -any NE of that subeconomy will be also a NE of the economy as a whole.
We should not completely rule out such inactive or partially inactive solutions as unrealistic on their face. It can plausibly be argued that the real world is full of "latent" markets awaiting discovery which can only become active by an act of faith on the part of the first entrants. But we are interested in active NE as well, and the possibility of inactive ones makes the main existence theorem, comparable to Theorem 1 above, considerably more delicate both to state and to prove. Sometimes markets are "legitimately" inactive, as when the traders start with a Paretooptimal distribution. The resolution of the problem seems to lie in demanding that inactive trading posts have "virtual prices" at which all traders find it in their best interest neither to buy nor to sell (Shapley 1976).
A. Multiperiod Extensions
Many applications of our general approach can benefit from-and some will require-the adoption of a multiperiod framework. Specifically, we may mention the study of (a) credit and bankruptcy, (b) nonsymmetric information conditions, (c) uncertainty and insurance, (d) cyclical variation of endowments and the money market, (e) the derived utility of fiat money, (f) interest rates and inflation, and (g) the role of capital goods and ownership shares. Shubik and others have devised exploratory game models for most of these situations and have worked out a number of tutorial examples (see Shubik 1972 Shubik , 1973 Shubik , 1977 Shubik and Whitt 1973; and Dubey and Shubik 1976 ). There remains, however, much more that can and should be done.
There remain also some serious conceptual problems with the general mathematical theory for multistage models of this type. One kind of difficulty is already apparent if we try merely to extend our basic prototype, without added features, to two or more periods. We should first recall that a vital ingredient in the proof of Theorem 1 (the existence theorem) is the concavity of the payoff functions fn'(b1, . . ., bn), with respect to their respective b'. The natural way to attack the two-period case is to solve the second stage parametrically, as a function of the cash distribution at the end of the first stage. But then the traders' total payoffs will include a term that depends on this cash distribution, and there seems no way to assure that this term will be concave.
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VII. Conclusion
In this paper, in an admittedly simplified and abstract setting, we have explored some elementary implications of an explicit market mechanism for the formation of price. We believe that this species of game-theoretic model, by being well defined independently of equilibrium conditions or behavioral assumptions (though capable of accommodating such conditions and assumptions) and by reflecting the decentralized decision making attainable through the use of a tangible money, is far more flexible as an investigatory and explanatory tool than the usual Walrasian model, with its ill-defined causal linkage between individual actions and the action of the system as a whole.
